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Abstract
In this paper, we consider physical layer security provisioning in multi-cell massive multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) systems. Specifically, we consider secure downlink transmission in a multi-cell massive MIMO system with
matched-filter precoding and artificial noise (AN) generation at the base station (BS) in the presence of a passive multi-
antenna eavesdropper. We investigate the resulting achievable ergodic secrecy rate and the secrecy outage probability
for the cases of perfect training and pilot contamination. Thereby, we consider two different AN shaping matrices,
namely, the conventional AN shaping matrix, where the AN is transmitted in the null space of the matrix formed by all
user channels, and a random AN shaping matrix, which avoids the complexity associated with finding the null space
of a large matrix. Our analytical and numerical results reveal that in multi-cell massive MIMO systems employing
matched-filter precoding (1) AN generation is required to achieve a positive ergodic secrecy rate if the user and the
eavesdropper experience the same path-loss, (2) even with AN generation secure transmission may not be possible if the
number of eavesdropper antennas is too large and not enough power is allocated to channel estimation, (3) for a given
fraction of power allocated to AN and a given number of users, in case of pilot contamination, the ergodic secrecy rate
is not a monotonically increasing function of the number of BS antennas, and (4) random AN shaping matrices provide
a favourable performance/complexity tradeoff and are an attractive alternative to conventional AN shaping matrices.
Index Terms
Physical layer security, massive MIMO, multi-cell systems, ergodic secrecy rate, and pilot contamination.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is a vital issue in wireless networks due to the broadcast nature of the medium. Traditionally,
security has been achieved through cryptographic encryption implemented at the application layer. This
This work was presented in part at IEEE Globecom, Atlanta, December 2013.
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2approach is based on certain assumptions regarding computational complexity, and is thereby potentially
vulnerable [1]. As a complement to cryptographic methods, physical layer security has drawn significant
research and industrial interest recently. The pioneering work on physical layer security in [2] considered
the classical three-terminal network consisting of a transmitter (Alice), an intended receiver (Bob), and an
eavesdropper (Eve). It was shown in [2] that a source-destination pair can exchange perfectly secure messages
with a positive rate as long as the desired receiver enjoys better channel conditions than the eavesdropper(s).
More recent studies have considered physical layer security provisioning in multi-antenna multiuser networks
[3]- [7]. Although the secrecy capacity region for multiuser networks remains an open problem, it is interesting
to investigate the achievable secrecy rates of such networks for certain practical transmission strategies.
Eavesdroppers are typically passive so as to hide their existence, and thus their channel state information
(CSI) cannot be obtained by Alice [8]. In this case, multiple transmit antennas can be exploited to enhance
secrecy by simultaneously transmitting both the information-bearing signal and artificial noise (AN) [9].
Specifically, precoding is used to make the AN invisible to Bob while degrading the decoding performance
of possibly present Eves [8]- [11]. For the case of imperfect channel estimation, robust beamforming designs
were reported in [8], [11].
Recently, a new promising design approach for cellular networks, known as massive or large-scale multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO), has been proposed [12], [13], where base station (BS) antenna arrays are
equipped with an order of magnitude more elements than what is used in current systems, i.e., a hundred
antennas or more. Massive MIMO enjoys all the benefits of conventional multiuser MIMO, such as im-
proved data rate, reliability and reduced interference, but at a much larger scale and with simple linear
precoding/detection schemes. In fact, massive MIMO employing simple matched-filter precoding/combining
enables large gains in bandwidth and/or power efficiency compared to conventional MIMO systems [13],
[14] as the effects of noise and interference vanish completely in the limit of an infinite number of antennas.
Furthermore, in time-division duplex (TDD) systems, channel reciprocity can be exploited to estimate the
downlink channels via uplink training such that the resulting overhead scales linearly with the number of
users but is independent of the number of BS antennas [15]. However, if the pilot sequences employed in
different cells are not orthogonal, so-called pilot contamination impairs the channel estimates and limits the
achievable information rates in massive MIMO systems [13], [16].
Massive MIMO systems offer an abundance of BS antennas, while multiple transmit antennas can be
exploited for secrecy enhancement. Therefore, the combination of both concepts seems natural and promising,
which is the main motivation for the present work. However, several new issues arise for physical layer security
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3provisioning in multi-cell massive MIMO systems that are not present for conventional MIMO systems [1]-
[11]. For example, pilot contamination is unique to massive MIMO systems and we study its effect on
the ergodic secrecy rate and the secrecy outage probability. Furthermore, for the user data, matched-filter
precoding is usually adopted in massive MIMO systems [12], [13], since the matrix inversion needed for
the schemes used in conventional MIMO, such as regularized zero-forcing (ZF) and minimum mean squared
error (MMSE) precoding, is considered to be computationally too expensive for the large matrices typical for
massive MIMO. Similarly, whereas in conventional MIMO systems the AN is transmitted in the null space
of the channel matrix [9], the complexity associated with computing the null space may not be affordable in
case of massive MIMO and simpler AN shaping methods may be needed. Finally, unlike most of the related
work [1]- [11], we consider a multi-cell setting where not only the data signals cause inter-cell interference
but also the AN, which has to be carefully taken into account for system design.
In this paper, we study secure downlink transmission in multi-cell massive MIMO systems in the presence
of a multi-antenna eavesdropper, which attempts to intercept the signal intended for one of the users. To arrive
at an achievable secrecy rate for this user, we assume that the eavesdropper can acquire perfect knowledge of
the channel state information (CSI) of all user data channels and is able to cancel all interfering user signals.
Under this assumption, we derive tight lower bounds for the ergodic secrecy rate and tight upper bounds for
the secrecy outage probability for the cases of perfect training and pilot contamination. The derived bounds are
in closed form and provide significant insight for system design. In particular, the obtained results allow us to
predict under what conditions (i.e., for what number of BS antennas, eavesdropper antennas, users, path-loss,
number of cells, and pilot powers) a positive secrecy rate is possible. Furthermore, we show that employing
random AN shaping matrices is an attractive low-complexity option for massive MIMO systems. We also
derive a closed-form expression for the fraction of transmit power that should be optimally allocated to AN
and show that, for a given number of BS antennas, this fraction increases with the number of eavesdropper
antennas and decreases with the number of users in the system.
Notations: Subscripts T and H stand for the transpose and the conjugate transpose, respectively. IN and
0N denote the N-dimensional identity matrix and the all-zero column vector of length N , respectively.
The expectation operation, variance operation, and Euclidean norm are denoted by E[·], var[·], and ‖ · ‖2,
respectively. Cm×n represents the space of all m × n matrices with complex-valued elements. Furthermore,
X and X denote an upper bound and a lower bound for X , respectively, i.e., X ≤ X ≤ X . Finally, we use
x ∼ CN(0N ,Σ) to denote a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian vector x ∈ CN×1 with zero mean and
covariance matrix Σ, and x ∼ χ2n means that
√
2x is a chi-square random variable with n degrees of freedom.
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Fig. 1. Multi-cell massive MIMO system in the presence of a multi-antenna eavesdropper. The shaded cell is the local cell. The MTs in the
local cell suffer from the inter-cell interference caused by data and AN transmission in the six adjacent cells.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we introduce the channel model, the channel estimation scheme, the transmission format, and
two AN shaping matrix designs for the considered secure multi-cell massive MIMO system. For convenience,
the most important variables used in this paper are defined in Table I.
A. System and Channel Models
In this paper, we consider a flat-fading multi-cell system consisting of M cells, as depicted in Fig. 1.
Each cell comprises an Nt-antenna BS and K single-antenna mobile terminals (MTs)1. The nth cell, n ∈
{1, . . . ,M}, is the local cell (the shaded area in Fig. 1). An eavesdropper equipped with Ne antennas
(equivalent to Ne cooperative single-antenna eavesdroppers) is located in the local cell of the considered
multi-cell region. The eavesdropper is passive and seeks to recover the information transmitted to the kth MT
in the local cell. Let hmk ∈ C1×Nt and Hevem ∈ CNe×Nt denote the channel between the mth BS, m = 1, . . . ,M ,
and the kth MT in the local cell and the channel between the mth BS and the eavesdropper, respectively.
hmk =
√
lmkh˜mk comprises the path-loss, lmk, and the small-scale fading vector, h˜mk ∼ CN(0TNt , INt).
1We note that the results derived in this paper can be easily extended to multi-antenna MTs if the BS transmits one independent data stream
per MT receive antenna and receive combining is not performed at the MTs. In this case, each MT receive antenna can be treated as one (virtual)
MT and the results derived in this paper are applicable. For example, the secrecy rate of a multi-antenna MT can be obtained by summing up
the secrecy rates of its receive antennas.
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5TABLE I
SUMMARY OF MOST IMPORTANT VARIABLES USED IN THIS PAPER.
Symbols Description
M Number of cells
Nt Number of BS antennas
Ne Number of eavesdropper antennas
α Ratio of the number of eavesdropper antennas and the number of BS antennas
K Number of MTs in each cell
β Ratio of the number of MTs in each cell and the number of BS antennas
lmk Path-loss between the mth BS and the kth MT in the local cell
levem Path-loss between the mth BS and the eavesdropper
ρ Inter-cell interference factor
P Total transmit power
φ Power allocation factor between signal transmission and AN generation
pτ Power of pilot symbol
τ Pilot sequence length
a Parameter (a = (M − 1)ρ+ 1)
b Parameter (b = (M − 1)ρ+ 1/P )
c Parameter (c = (M − 1)ρ2 + 1)
ζ Parameter (ζ = aβ/α− βc/[a(1− β)])
λ Measure for quality of channel estimates (λ = pττ/(1 + pττa))
αsec A positive secrecy rate is possible only if α < αsec
h˜mk Small-scale fading vector between the mth BS and the kth MT in the local cell
hmk Channel vector between the mth BS and the kth MT in the local cell
hˆmk Estimate of the channel vector between the mth BS and the kth MT in the local cell
H˜
eve
m Small-scale fading matrix between the mth BS and the eavesdropper
H
eve
m Channel matrix between the mth BS and the eavesdropper
γnk Received SINR at the kth MT in the local cell
γeve Received SINR at the eavesdropper
Rnk Achievable ergodic rate of the kth MT in the local cell
Cevenk Ergodic capacity of the eavesdropper seeking to decode the signal of the kth MT in the local cell
Rsecnk Ergodic secrecy rate of the kth MT in the local cell
εout Secrecy outage probability of the kth MT in the local cell
Similarly, we model the eavesdropper channel as Hevem =
√
levem H˜
eve
m , where levem and H˜evem denote the path-
loss and small-scale fading components, respectively. The elements of H˜evem are modeled as independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian random variables (r.v.s) with zero mean and unit variance.
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6B. Uplink Training and Channel Estimation
In this paper, we assume that the BSs are perfectly synchronized and operate in the TDD mode with
universal frequency reuse. Furthermore, we assume that the path-losses between all users in the system and
the local BS, lmk, m = 1, . . . ,M , k = 1, . . .K, are known at the local BS, whereas the small-scale fading
vectors h˜mk, m = 1, . . . ,M , k = 1, . . .K, are not known and the local BS estimates only the small-scale
fading vectors of the MTs within the local cell. These assumptions are motivated by the fact that the path-
losses change on a much slower time scale than the small-scale fading vectors, and thus, their estimation
creates a comparatively low overhead.
The local BS estimates the downlink CSI of all MTs, h˜nk, k = 1, . . . , K, by exploiting reverse training
and channel reciprocity [12]- [16]. We consider two scenarios: Perfect training and imperfect training which
results in pilot contamination [16]. In the former case, all MK MTs in the system emit orthogonal pilot
sequences in the training phase having a sufficiently large pilot power pτ such that hˆnk = h˜nk, k = 1, . . . , Nt,
can be assumed, where hˆnk denotes the estimated channel in the local cell. In the latter case, the K pilot
sequences used in a cell are still orthogonal but all cells use the same pilot sequences. Let
√
τωk ∈ Cτ×1
denote the pilot sequence of length τ transmitted by the kth MT in each cell in the training phase, where
ω
H
k ωk = 1 and ωHk ωj = 0, ∀, j, k = 1, . . . , K, k 6= j. Assuming perfect synchronization, the training signal
received at the local BS, Ypilotn ∈ Cτ×Nt , can be expressed as
Ypilotn =
M∑
m=1
K∑
k=1
√
pττlmkωkh˜mk +Nn, (1)
where Nn ∈ Cτ×Nt is a Gaussian noise matrix having zero mean, unit variance elements. Assuming MMSE
channel estimation [16], [19], the estimate of h˜nk given Ypilotn is obtained as
hˆnk =
√
pττlnkω
H
k
(
Iτ + ωk
(
pττ
M∑
m=1
lmk
)
ω
H
k
)−1
Ypilotn =
√
pττlnk
1 + pττ
∑M
m=1 lmk
ω
H
k Y
pilot
n
=
√
pττlnk
1 + pττ
∑M
m=1 lmk
M∑
m=1
√
pττ h˜mk +
√
pττlnk
1 + pττ
∑M
m=1 lmk
ω
H
k Nn. (2)
For MMSE estimation, we can express the channel as h˜nk = hˆnk + enk, where the estimate hˆnk and the
estimation error enk ∈ C1×Nt are mutually independent. Hence, considering (2) we can statistically characterize
hˆnk and enk as hˆnk ∼ CN
(
0TNt ,
pτ τlnk
1+pτ τ
∑M
m=1 lmk
INt
)
and enk ∼ CN
(
0TNt ,
1+pτ τ
∑
m6=n lmk
1+pτ τ
∑M
m=1 lmk
INt
)
, respectively.
We note that in order to be able to find the required numbers of orthogonal pilot sequences, pilot sequence
lengths of τ ≥ MK and τ ≥ K are required for the cases of perfect training and pilot contamination,
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7respectively. Furthermore, we note that the eavesdropper could emit his own pilot symbols to impair the
channel estimates obtained at the BS to improve his ability to decode the MTs’ signals during downlink
transmission [17]. However, this would also increase the chance that the presence of the eavesdropper is
detected by the BS [18]. Therefore, in this paper, we assume the eavesdropper is purely passive and leave
the study of active eavesdroppers in massive MIMO systems for future work.
C. Downlink Data Transmission
In the local cell, the BS intends to transmit a confidential signal snk to the kth MT. The signal vector for the
K MTs is denoted by sn =
[
sn1, . . . , snK
]T ∈ CK×1 with E[snsHn ] = IK . Each signal vector sn is multiplied
by a transmit beamforming matrix, Wn = [wn1, . . . ,wnk, . . . ,wnK ] ∈ CNt×K , before transmission. As typical
for massive MIMO systems, we adopt simple matched-filter precoding, i.e., wnk = hˆHnk/‖hˆnk‖ [13], [16],
since the matrix inversion required for ZF and MMSE precoding is computationally too expensive for the
large number of users and antenna elements that are typical for massive MIMO systems. Furthermore, we
assume that the eavesdropper’s CSI is not available at the local BS. Hence, assuming that there are K < Nt
MTs, the BS may use the remaining Nt − K degrees of freedom offered by the Nt transmit antennas for
emission of AN to degrade the eavesdropper’s ability to decode the data intended for the MTs [8], [9], [11].
The AN vector, zn = [zn1, . . . , zn(Nt−K)]T ∼ CN(0Nt−K , INt−K), is multiplied by an AN shaping matrix
Vn = [vn1, . . . ,vni, . . . ,vn(Nt−K)] ∈ CNt×(Nt−K) with ‖vni‖ = 1, i = 1, . . . , Nt−K. The considered choices
for the AN shaping matrix will be discussed in the next subsection. The signal vector transmitted by the local
BS is given by
xn =
√
pWnsn +
√
qVnzn =
K∑
k=1
√
pwnksnk +
Nt−K∑
i=1
√
qvnizni, (3)
where p and q denote the transmit power allocated to each MT and each AN signal, respectively, i.e., for
simplicity, we assume uniform power allocation across users and AN signals, respectively. Let the total transmit
power be denoted by P . Then, p and q can be represented as p = φP
K
and q = (1−φ)P
Nt−K , respectively, where the
power allocation factor φ, 0 < φ ≤ 1, strikes a power balance between the information-bearing signal and
the AN.
The M − 1 cells adjacent to the local cell transmit their own signals and AN. In this work, in order to be
able to gain some fundamental insights, we assume that all cells employ identical values for p and q as well
as φ. Accordingly, the received signals at the kth MT in the local cell, ynk, and at the eavesdropper, yeve, are
May 29, 2014 DRAFT
8given by
ynk =
√
phnkwnksnk +
∑
{m,l}6={n,k}
√
phmkwmlsml +
M∑
m=1
√
qhmkVmzm + nnk (4)
yeve =
√
p
M∑
m=1
Hevem Wmsm +
√
q
M∑
m=1
Hevem Vmzm + neve, (5)
where nnk ∼ CN(0, σ2nk) and neve ∼ CN(0Ne , σ2eveINe) are the Gaussian noises at the kth MT and at the
eavesdropper, respectively. The first term on the right hand side of (4) is the signal intended for the kth MT
in the local cell with effective channel gain √phnkwnk, which is assumed to be perfectly known at the kth
MT in the local cell. The second and the third terms on the right hand side of (4) represent intra-cell/inter-
cell interference and AN leakage, respectively. On the other hand, the eavesdropper observes an MNt ×Ne
MIMO channel comprising K local user signals, (M − 1)K out-of-cell user signals, Nt −K local cell AN
signals, and (Nt − K)(M − 1) out-of-cell AN signals. In order to obtain a lower bound on the achievable
secrecy rate, we assume that the eavesdropper can acquire perfect knowledge of the effective channels of all
MTs, i.e., Hevem wmk, ∀m, k. We note however that this is a quite pessimistic assumption because the uplink
training performed in massive MIMO [16] makes it difficult for the eavesdropper to perform accurate channel
estimation.
D. Design of AN Shaping Matrix Vn
In this paper, we consider two different designs for the AN shaping matrix Vn.
Null-space method: For conventional (non-massive) MIMO, Vn is usually chosen to lie in the null space
of the estimated channel, hˆnk, i.e., hˆnkVn = 0TNt−K , k = 1, . . . , K, which is possible as long as Nt > K holds
[9]. We refer to this method as N in the following. If perfect CSI is available, i.e., hˆnk = h˜nk, the N -method
prevents impairment of the users in the local cell by AN generated by the local BS. However, in case of
pilot contamination, AN leakage to the users in the local cell is unavoidable. More importantly, for the large
values of Nt and K typical for massive MIMO systems, computation of the null space of hˆnk, k = 1, . . . , K,
is computationally expensive. This motivates the introduction of a simpler method for generation of the AN
shaping matrix.
Random method: In this case, the columns of Vn are mutually independent random vectors. We refer to
this method as R in the following. Here, we construct the columns of Vn as vni = v˜ni/‖v˜ni‖, where the
v˜ni, i = 1, . . . , Nt − K, are mutually independent Gaussian random vectors. Note that the R-method does
not even attempt to avoid AN leakage to the users in the local cell. However, it may still improve the ergodic
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9secrecy rate as the precoding vector for the desired user signal, wnk, is correlated with the user channel, h˜nk,
whereas the columns of the AN shaping matrix are not correlated with the user channel.
Our results in Sections IV-VI reveal that although the N -method always achieves a better performance than
the R-method, if pilot contamination and inter-cell interference are significant, the performance differences
between both schemes are small. This makes the R-method an attractive alternative for massive MIMO
systems due to its simplicity.
III. ACHIEVABLE ERGODIC SECRECY RATE ANALYSIS
In this section, we first show that the achievable ergodic secrecy rate of the kth MT in the local cell can
be expressed as the difference between the achievable ergodic rate of the MT and the ergodic capacity of the
eavesdropper. Subsequently, we provide a simple lower bound on the achievable ergodic rate of the MT, a
closed-form expression for the ergodic capacity of the eavesdropper, and a simple and tight upper bound for
the ergodic capacity of the eavesdropper. The results derived in this section are valid for both perfect training
and pilot contamination as well as for both AN shaping matrix designs. For convenience, we define the ratio
of the number of eavesdropper antennas and the number of BS antennas as α = Ne/Nt, and the ratio of the
number of users and the number of BS antennas as β = K/Nt. In the following, we are interested in the
asymptotic regime where Nt →∞ but α and β are constant.
A. Achievable Ergodic Secrecy Rate
The ergodic secrecy rate is an appropriate performance measure if delays can be afforded and coding over
many independent channel realizations (i.e., over many coherence intervals) is possible [10]. Considering the
kth MT in the local cell, the considered channel is an instance of a multiple-input, single-output, multiple
eavesdropper (MISOME) wiretap channel [3]. In the following lemma, we provide an expression for an
achievable ergodic secrecy rate of the kth MT in the local cell.
Lemma 1: An achievable ergodic secrecy rate of the kth MT in the local cell is given by
Rsecnk = [Rnk − Cevenk ]+, (6)
where [x]+ = max{0, x}, Rnk is an achievable ergodic rate of the kth MT in the local cell, and Cevenk is the
ergodic capacity between the local BS and the eavesdropper seeking to decode the information of the kth
MT in the local cell. Thereby, it is assumed that the eavesdropper is able to cancel the received signals of all
May 29, 2014 DRAFT
10
in-cell and out-of-cell MTs except the signal intended for the MT of interest, i.e.,
Cevenk = E
[
log2
(
1 + pwHnkH
eveH
n X
−1Heven wnk
) ]
, (7)
where X = q
∑M
m=1V
H
mH
eveH
m H
eve
m Vm denotes the noise correlation matrix at the eavesdropper under the
worst-case assumption that the receiver noise is negligible, i.e., σ2eve → 0.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A.
Eq. (6) reveals that the achievable ergodic secrecy rate of the kth MT in the local cell has the subtractive
form typical for many wiretap channels [1]- [11], i.e., it is the difference of an achievable ergodic rate of
the user of interest and the capacity of the eavesdropper. Before we analyze (6) for perfect training and pilot
contamination in Sections IV and V, respectively, we derive general expressions for Rnk and Cevenk , which
apply to both cases.
B. Lower Bound on the Achievable User Rate
Based on (4) an achievable ergodic rate of the kth MT in the local cell is given by
Rnk = E
[
log2
(
1 +
|√phnkwnk|2∑M
m=1
∑Nt−K
i=1 |
√
qhmkvmi|2 +
∑
{m,l}6={n,k} |
√
phmkwml|2 + σ2nk
)]
. (8)
Unfortunately, evaluating the expected value in (8) analytically is cumbersome. Therefore, we derive a lower
bound on the achievable ergodic rate of the kth MT in the local cell by following the same approach as in
[16]. In particular, we rewrite the received signal at the kth MT in the local cell as
ynk = E[
√
phnkwnk]snk + n
′
nk, (9)
where n′nk represents an effective noise, which is given by
n′nk = (
√
phnkwnk − E[√phnkwnk]) snk +
M∑
m=1
hmk
√
qVmzm +
∑
{m,l}6={n,k}
√
phmkwmlsml + nnk. (10)
Eq. (9) can be interpreted as an equivalent single-input single-output channel with constant gain E[√phnkwnk]
and AWGN n′nk. Hence, we can apply Theorem 1 in [16] to obtain a computable lower bound for the achievable
rate of the kth MT in the local cell as Rnk = log2(1 + γnk) ≤ Rnk, where γnk denotes the received signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR)
γnk =
desired signal︷ ︸︸ ︷
|E[√phnkwnk]|2
var[
√
phnkwnk]︸ ︷︷ ︸
signal leakage
+
M∑
m=1
Nt−K∑
i=1
E[|√qhmkvmi|2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
AN leakage
+
∑
{m,l}6={n,k}
E[|√phmkwml|2]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
intra- and inter-cell interference
+ σ2nk
(11)
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with var[√phnkwnk] = E[|√phnkwnk − E[√phnkwnk]|2]. We note that the derived lower bound on the
achievable rate is applicable to both AN shaping matrix designs and the cases of perfect training and pilot
contamination, respectively, cf. Sections IV and V. The tightness of the lower bound will be confirmed by
our results in Section VI.
C. Ergodic Capacity of the Eavesdropper
In this section, we provide a closed-form expression for the ergodic capacity of the eavesdropper valid for
both perfect training and pilot contamination. To gain more insight, we adopt a simplified path-loss model for
the eavesdropper, i.e., the path-losses between the BSs and the eavesdropper are given by levem = 1 if n = m
and levem = ρ if n 6= m, i.e., the path-loss between the local BS and the eavesdropper is 1 and the path-loss
between the BSs of the other cells and the eavesdropper is ρ ∈ [0, 1].2 A similar simplified path-loss model
was used in [19] for the user channels. The resulting ergodic secrecy capacity is summarized in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1: For Nt →∞ and both the N and the R AN shaping matrix designs, the ergodic capacity of
the eavesdropper in (7) can be written as
Cevenk =
1
ln 2
Ne−1∑
i=0
λi × 1
µ0
2∑
j=1
bj∑
l=2
ωjlI(1/µj, l), (12)
where λi =
(
M(Nt−K)
i
)
, µ0 =
∏2
j=1 µ
bj
j ,
(µj, bj) =


(η,Nt −K), j = 1
(ρη, (M − 1)(Nt −K)), j = 2,
(13)
η = q/p,
ωjl =
1
(bj − l)!
dbj−l
dxbj−l
(
xi∏
s 6=j(x+
1
µs
)bs
) ∣∣∣∣
x=− 1
µj
, (14)
and I(a, n) =
∫∞
0
1
(x+1)(x+a)n
dx, a, n > 0. A closed-form expression for I(·, ·) is given in [20, Lemma 3].
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B.
A lower bound on the achievable ergodic secrecy rate of the kth MT in the local cell for the N /R methods is
obtained by combining (6), (11), and (12). However, the expression for the ergodic capacity of the eavesdropper
2We note that the simplified path-loss model is only adopted to reduce the number of parameters. The ergodic capacity and the ergodic secrecy
rate can also be derived for the original path-loss model in closed form. However, the resulting equations are more cumbersome and less insightful
compared to those for the simplified model.
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in (12) is somewhat cumbersome and offers little insight into the impact of the various system parameters.
Hence, in the next subsection, we derive a simple and tight upper bound for Cevenk .
D. Tight Upper Bound on the Ergodic Capacity of the Eavesdropper
In the following theorem, we provide a tight upper bound for the ergodic capacity of the eavesdropper.
Theorem 2: For Nt →∞ and both the N and the R AN shaping matrix generation methods, the ergodic
capacity of the eavesdropper in (7) is upper bounded by 3
Cevenk < C
eve
nk ≈ log2
(
1 +
α
ηa(1− β)− cηα/a
)
= log2
(
(1− ζ)φ+ ζ
−ζφ+ ζ
)
, (15)
if β < 1−cα/a2, where we introduce the definitions a = 1+ρ(M−1), c = 1+ρ2(M−1), and ζ = aβ
α
− βc
a(1−β) .
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C.
Remark 1: We note that a finite eavesdropper capacity results only if matrix X in (7) is invertible. Since
Hevem , m = 1, . . . ,M , are independent matrices with i.i.d. entries, X is invertible if M(Nt − K) ≤ Ne or
equivalently β ≤ 1− α/M . Regardless of the values of M and ρ, we have
1− α/[1 + ρ2(M − 1)] ≤ 1− cα/a2 ≤ 1− α/M. (16)
For M = 1 or ρ = 1, equality holds in (16). For M > 1 and ρ < 1, the condition for β in Theorem 2 is in
general stricter than the invertibility condition for X. Nevertheless, the typical operating region for a massive
MIMO system is β ≪ 1 [12], [13], where the upper bound in Theorem 2 is applicable.
Eq. (15) reveals that Cevenk is monotonically increasing in α, i.e., as expected, the eavesdropper can enhance
his eavesdropping capability by deploying more antennas. Furthermore, in the relevant parameter range,
0 < β < 1 − cα/a2, Cevenk is not monotonic in β but a decreasing function for β ∈ (0, 1 −
√
cα/a) and
an increasing function for β ∈ (1 − √cα/a, 1 − cα/a2). Hence, Cevenk has a minimum at β = 1 −
√
cα/a.
Assuming Nt and Ne are fixed, this behaviour can be explained as follows. For small K (corresponding to
small β), the capacity of the eavesdropper is large because the amount of power allocated to the intercepted
MT, φP/K, is large. As K increases, the power allocated to the MT decreases which leads to a decrease
in the capacity. However, if K is increased beyond a certain point, X becomes increasingly ill-conditioned
which leads to an increase in the eavesdropper capacity.
3We note that, strictly speaking, we have not proved that (15) is a bound since we used an approximation for its derivation, see Appendix C.
However, this approximation is known to be very accurate [26] and comparisons of (15) with simulation results for various system parameters
suggest that (15) is indeed an upper bound.
May 29, 2014 DRAFT
13
Combining now (6), (11), and (15) gives a tight lower bound on the ergodic secrecy rate of the kth MT in
the local cell for both the N and the R methods. To gain more insight, in the next two sections, we specialize
the tight lower bound on the ergodic secrecy rate to the cases of perfect training and pilot contamination,
respectively. This will allow us to further simplify the SINR expression of the kth MT in the local cell and
the resulting ergodic secrecy rate expression.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS FOR PERFECT TRAINING
In this section, we analyze the secrecy performance of the considered downlink multi-cell massive MIMO
system under the assumption of perfect CSI, i.e., hˆnk = h˜nk, k = 1, . . . , K. To this end, for both considered
AN generation methods, we first simplify the lower bound on the achievable ergodic rate expression derived
in Section III-B by taking into account the perfect CSI assumption. Subsequently, exploiting this result, we
derive simple and insightful lower bounds on the achievable ergodic secrecy rate. Finally, we obtain an upper
bound on the secrecy outage probability.
A. Lower Bound on the Achievable Ergodic Rate
We first characterize some of the terms in (11) for the case of perfect training in the following lemma.
Lemma 2: The received signal and interference powers at the kth MT in the local cell can be expressed as
E[h˜nkwnk]
2 = E2[x] and E[|h˜nkwmk|2] = E[|h˜nkvmi|2] = E[y2], ∀n 6= m (17)
respectively, where x2 =
∑Nt
l=1 |ul|2 ∼ χ22Nt , y2 = |ul|2 ∼ χ22, ul are i.i.d. complex Gaussian r.v.s with zero
mean and unit variance, and E[y2] = 1.
Proof: Since each element of h˜nk follows a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit variance and
wnk =
hH
nk
‖hnk‖ =
h˜H
nk
‖h˜nk‖ , |h˜nkwnk|
2 is a (scaled) chi-square r.v. with 2Nt degrees of freedom and statistically
equivalent to x2. On the other hand, since wml, ∀{m, l} 6= {n, k}, and vmi are unit-norm vectors and
independent of the small-scale fading vector h˜nk, the normalized interference terms, |h˜nkwmk|2 and |h˜nkvmi|2,
are (scaled) chi-square r.v.s with 2 degrees of freedom and statistically equivalent to y2.
Introducing x and y in (11) and dividing both numerator and denominator by p, we obtain the SINRs for
the N and R AN shaping matrices as
γNnk =
lnkE
2[x]
lnkvar[x] + η
∑M
m6=n lmk
∑Nt−K
i=1 E[y
2] +
∑
{m,l}6={n,k} lmkE[y
2] + K
φP
(18)
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and
γRnk =
lnkE
2[x]
lnkvar[x] + η
∑M
m=1 lmk
∑Nt−K
i=1 E[y
2] +
∑
{m,l}6={n,k} lmkE[y
2] + K
φP
, (19)
respectively. The right hand sides of (18) and (19) differ only in the second term of the denominator, where
γRnk contains an additional term ηlnk
∑Nt−K
i=1 E[y
2], which is due to the AN leakage caused in the local cell.
This term is absent in γNnk as, for perfect CSI, the N -method avoids AN leakage in the local cell. Hence,
γNnk > γ
R
nk always holds. Since for large Nt we have [16]
lim
Nt→∞
E2[x]
Nt
= 1 and lim
Nt→∞
var[x]
Nt
= 0, (20)
we obtain from (18) and (19)
lim
Nt→∞
γNnk =
lnkNt
η
∑M
m6=n lmk(Nt −K) +
∑
{m,l}6={n,k} lmk +
K
φP
(21)
and
lim
Nt→∞
γRnk =
lnkNt
η
∑M
m=1 lmk(Nt −K) +
∑
{m,l}6={n,k} lmk +
K
φP
, (22)
respectively. In order to obtain simple yet insightful results, we adopt in the following a simplified path-loss
model [19], similar to the simplified model introduced for the eavesdropper in Section III-C. In particular,
we model the path-losses as lmk = 1 if n = m and lmk = ρ if n 6= m, i.e., the path-loss between the local
BS and the MTs in the local cell is 1 and the path-loss between the BSs of the other cells and the MTs in
the local cell is ρ. Hence, (21) and (22) simplify to
lim
Nt→∞
γNnk =
1
(M − 1)ρ(1− β)η + (M − 1)βρ+ β + β
φP
(23)
and
lim
Nt→∞
γRnk =
1
((M − 1)ρ+ 1)(1− β)η + (M − 1)βρ+ β + β
φP
, (24)
respectively. The ergodic rate for the two considered AN shaping matrix generation methods is lower bounded
by RΨnk = log2(1 + γΨnk), where Ψ ∈ {N ,R}. We note that for systems with few users, i.e., β → 0, and
Nt →∞, the lower bounds on the ergodic rate reduce to
RNnk ≈ log2
(
1 +
1
η(M − 1)ρ
)
and RRnk ≈ log2
(
1 +
1
η((M − 1)ρ+ 1)
)
, (25)
i.e., performance is limited by AN leakage. This is in contrast to massive MIMO systems without AN
generation, whose performance in the considered regime (β → 0) is only limited by pilot contamination [12],
[13], which is not considered in this section but will be addressed in Section V. Moreover, (25) suggests that
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the performance difference between the N -method and the R-method diminishes if the AN leakage from
adjacent cells, which is proportional to η(M − 1)ρ for both methods, dominates the AN leakage for the
R-method in the local cell, which is proportional to η.
Closed-form expressions for the lower bound on the achievable ergodic secrecy rate of the kth MT in the
local cell for the N /R methods are obtained by combining (6), (12), and (23)/(24). The tightness of the
proposed lower bounds will be confirmed in Section VI via simulations.
B. Impact of System Parameters on Ergodic Secrecy Rate
In this subsection, we provide insight into the influence of the various system parameters on the ergodic
secrecy rate. Combining (6), (23)/(24), and the upper bound on the ergodic secrecy capacity in (15), simple
lower bounds for the ergodic secrecy rate valid for Nt →∞ are obtained as
Rsec,Nnk =
[
log2
(
bβζ + (β + 1− bβ)ζφ− (β + 1)ζφ2
bβζ + [β(1− ζ) + bβζ ]φ+ β(1− ζ)φ2
)]+
, (26)
Rsec,Rnk =
[
log2
(
(b+ 1)βζ + [1− (b+ 1)β]ζφ− ζφ2
(b+ 1)βζ + (b+ 1)β(1− ζ)φ
)]+
, (27)
where b = (M−1)ρ+1/P and η = q/p = β(1/φ−1)/(1−β) was used. In the following, we first investigate
for what values of α a non-zero ergodic secrecy rate can be achieved.
Impact of α: Let us denote the upper limit for α such that a positive secrecy rate can be achieved as αsec.
For the N -method and the R-method, we obtain from (26) and (27), respectively, positive secrecy rates if
α < αΨsec, Ψ ∈ {N ,R}, with
αNsec =
a2(1− β)
ab(1 − β) + c
β→0
=
a
b+ c/a
=
1 + ρ(M − 1)
1/P + ρ(M − 1) + c/a (28)
and
αRsec =
a2(1− β)
a(b+ 1)(1− β) + c
β→0
=
a
b+ 1 + c/a
=
1
1 + 1/[P (ρ(M − 1) + 1)] + c/a2 . (29)
In both cases, αΨsec is obtained for φ→ 0, i.e., almost the entire transmit power is allocated to AN generation.
For both methods, αsec is monotonically decreasing in β. Furthermore, we always have αRsec < αNsec, i.e., the
N -method can tolerate a larger number of eavesdropper antennas than the R-method at the expense of a
higher complexity in calculating the AN shaping matrix. The robustness of both AN shaping matrix designs
can be improved by increasing the transmit power P . However, based on (28) and (29) it can be shown
that even for P → ∞, the maximum values of α that yield a non-zero ergodic secrecy rate are limited as
αNsec ≤ 4/3 and αRsec ≤ 1 regardless of the choice of M and ρ. We note that for a single-cell system with
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a single user, it was shown in [3] that the N -method can achieve non-zero secrecy rate for α < 2. The
smaller number of tolerable eavesdropper antennas in the considered massive MIMO system are caused by
the suboptimal matched-filter precoding at the base station, which was chosen for complexity reasons.
Impact of φ: Eqs. (26) and (27) reveal that zero secrecy rate results for φ = φ0 = 0 and for a second value
φ = φΨ1 , 0 < φ
Ψ
1 < 1, where Ψ ∈ {N ,R}. Specifically, φΨ1 is given by
φN1 = 1−
αa(1− β)(b+ 1)
a2(1− β)(1 + α/a)− cα (30)
φR1 = 1−
αa(1− β)(b+ 1)
a2(1− β)− cα (31)
where φΨ1 < 1 follows from the condition β < 1 − cα/a2 which is required for the validity of the upper
bound on the ergodic secrecy capacity in (15). For φ = 0, all power is allocated to AN generation and no
power is left for information transmission. On the other hand, for φ = φΨ1 , the amount of AN generated is not
sufficient to prevent the eavesdropper from decoding the transmitted signal. This suggests that for α < αΨsec,
Ψ ∈ {N ,R}, there exists an optimal φ, 0 < φ < φΨ1 , which maximizes the achievable ergodic secrecy rate.
The values of the optimal φ can be obtained from (26) and (27) as
φ∗N =
−(bβ + bζ) +√b(b+ 1)(ζ − bβ + βζ + bβζ)
1 + b+ β − bζ , (32)
φ∗R =
−ζ +√ζ − β − bβ + ζβ + bβζ
1− ζ . (33)
Impact of β: It can be shown from (32) and (33) that for both the N and R methods the optimal φ is a
monotonically increasing function of β ∈ (0, 1 − cα/a2). Thus, as the number of MTs in the cell increase,
the amount of power allocated to AN generation decreases. This can be explained by the fact that as β
increases, the transmit power per MT used for information transmission, φP/K, decreases. To compensate
for this effect, a larger φ is necessary. On the other hand, the ergodic secrecy rates for both the N and R
methods are decreasing functions of β ∈ (0, 1− cα/a2), cf. (26), (27), i.e., as expected, for a given number
of users the ergodic secrecy rates increase with increasing number of BS antennas. Surprisingly, this property
does not necessarily hold in case of pilot contamination, cf. Section V.
C. Secrecy Outage Probability Analysis
In delay limited scenarios, where one codeword spans only one channel realization, outages are unavoidable
since Alice does not have the CSI of the eavesdropper channel and the secrecy outage probability has to be
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used to characterize the performance of the system instead of the ergodic rate. For the considered multi-
cell massive MIMO system, the rate of the desired user, Rnk, becomes deterministic as Nt → ∞, but the
instantaneous capacity of the eavesdropper channel remains a random variable. A secrecy outage occurs
whenever the target secrecy rate R0 exceeds the actual instantaneous secrecy rate. Thus, the secrecy outage
probability of the kth MT in the local cell is given by
εout = Pr{Rnk − log2(1 + γeve) ≤ R0} = Pr{γeve ≥ 2Rnk−R0 − 1} = 1− Fγeve(2Rnk−R0 − 1), (34)
where γeve = pwHnkHeveHn X−1Heven wnk and Fγeve(x) is given in Appendix B. A closed-form upper bound on
the secrecy outage probability is obtained by replacing Rnk with RΨnk = log2(1 + γΨnk) with γΨnk given in
(23)/(24).
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS FOR PILOT CONTAMINATION
In this section, we analyze the performance of the considered multi-cell massive MIMO system for the case
of pilot contamination. To this end, we simplify the lower bound on the achievable ergodic rate expression
derived in Section III-B for the case of pilot contamination, derive insightful and tight lower bounds on the
ergodic secrecy rate, and provide a closed-form expression for the secrecy outage probability.
A. Lower Bound on the Achievable Ergodic Rate
The lower bound on the achievable ergodic rate of the users derived in Section III-B is also applicable in
case of pilot contamination. Thus, in a first step, we characterize the four expectations/variances in the SINR
expression in (11).
Expressing the small-scale fading vector as h˜nk = hˆnk + enk, cf. Section II, the denominator of (11) can
be rewritten as (we omit the path-loss for the moment)
E[h˜nkwnk] = E
[
‖hˆnk‖+ enk hˆnk‖hˆnk‖
]
= E[‖hˆnk‖] =
√
pττlnk
1 + pττ
∑M
m=1 lmk
E[x], (35)
where x2 ∼ χ22Nt , cf. Lemma 2. Furthermore, we observe from (2) that, at the local BS, the channel estimate
for the kth MT in the local cell involves the sum of all channel vectors between the local BS and the kth
MTs in all cells weighted with scaling factors
√
pτ τlmk
1+pτ τ
∑M
i=1 lik
. Thus, the transmit beamforming vector for the
kth MT in the local cell is also affected by the channel vectors between the local BS and the kth MTs in all
other cells. This is the fundamental problem introduced by pilot contamination. Using this observation, the
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interference caused by the kth MT in the mth cell to the local cell (i.e., the component of the third term of
the denominator in (11) with l = k) is given by
E[|h˜mkwmk|2] = E
[‖hˆmk‖2]+ E[ hˆHmk‖hˆmk‖eHmkemk
hˆmk
‖hˆmk‖
]
=
pττlmk
1 + pττ
∑M
p=1 lpk
E[x2] +
1 + pττ
∑
p 6=m lpk
1 + pττ
∑M
m=1 lmk
E[y2], (36)
where y2 ∼ χ22, cf. Lemma 1. Exploiting now (35) and (36) and the definition of variance, i.e., var[x] =
E[x2]− E2[x], we obtain for the signal leakage term in (11)
var[h˜nkwnk] =
pττlnk
1 + pττ
∑M
m=1 lmk
var[x] +
1 + pττ
∑
m6=n lmk
1 + pττ
∑M
m=1 lmk
E[y2]. (37)
Furthermore, the interference from the lth MT, where l 6= k, in the adjacent (i.e., non-local) cells is given by
E[|h˜mkwml|2] = E[y2], (38)
as each wml, ∀l 6= k, has unit norm and is independent of hmk. The inter-cell AN leakage is obtained as
E[|h˜mkvmi|2] = E[y2], ∀m, i, as vmi has unit norm and is independent of h˜mk. While the inter-cell AN leakage
and the terms calculated in (35)-(38) are identical for the N and R methods, the intra-cell AN leakage within
the local cell depends on the AN shaping matrix design. In particular, for the N -method, the AN is designed
to lie in the null space of the estimated channels of all K MTs in the local cell. Thus, the intra-cell AN
leakage is obtained as
E[|h˜nkvni|2] = E[vHnieHnkenkvni] =
1 + pττ
∑
m6=n lmk
1 + pτ τ
∑M
m=1 lmk
E[y2], (39)
due to the independence of vni, ∀i, and enk. On the other hand, for the R-method, the AN is generated
randomly, such that E[|h˜nkvni|2] = E[y2], since the vni, ∀i, have unit norm and are independent of h˜nk.
Plugging all intermediate results derived in this section so far into (11), we obtain
γNnk =
λnkE
2[x]
λnkvar[x] +
∑M
m=1
(
µmk + η
∑Nt−K
i=1 µˆmk +
∑
l 6=k lmk
)
E[y2] +
∑
m6=n λmkE[x
2] + K
φP
(40)
and
γRnk =
λnkE
2[x]
λnkvar[x] +
∑M
m=1
(
µmk + η
∑Nt−K
i=1 lmk +
∑
l 6=k lmk
)
E[y2] +
∑
m6=n λmkE[x
2] + K
φP
, (41)
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where λmk =
pτ τl
2
mk
1+pτ τ
∑M
p=1 lpk
, µmk = lmk
1+pττ
∑
p 6=m lpk
1+pτ τ
∑M
m=1 lmk
, and µˆmk =


µmk, m = n,
lmk, otherwise
. Adopting now the
same simplified interference model as in Section IV, (40) and (41) can be further simplified, and for large
Nt, the corresponding lower bound on the achievable ergodic rates are given by
RNnk = log2
(
1 +
λ
(a− λ)(1− β)η + bβ + (M − 1)ρ2λ+ β
φP
)
(42)
and
RRnk = log2
(
1 +
λ
a(1− β)η + bβ + (M − 1)ρ2λ+ β
φP
)
, (43)
where λ = pττ
1+pτ τa
. From (42) and (43) we observe that RNnk > RRnk always holds but the performance
difference diminishes if a ≫ λ. We note that for both AN shaping matrix designs the powers of the AN
leakage originating from other cells and the inter-cell interference are proportional to a − 1 = (M − 1)ρ.
Furthermore, for the N -method and the R-method, the AN leakage originating in the local cell is proportional
to (1 − λ)η and η, respectively. Therefore, a ≫ λ implies that the AN leakage originating from other cells
and the inter-cell interference are much stronger than the AN leakage in the local cell and/or the pilot power
pτ is not sufficiently large to prevent AN leakage for the N -method in the local cell. Furthermore, for β → 0,
we obtain RNnk = log2(1 + λ/[(a − λ)η + (M − 1)ρ2λ]) and RRnk = log2(1 + λ/[aη + (M − 1)ρ2λ]), i.e.,
in the asymptotic regime where the number of users is constant but the number of BS antennas increases
without bound, the performance for both AN shaping matrix designs is limited by both AN leakage and pilot
contamination.
Since the ergodic capacity of the eavesdropper is not affected by the imperfect CSI at the local BS, a lower
bound on the ergodic secrecy rate for pilot contamination can be calculated from (6), (7), and (42)/(43).
B. Impact of System Parameters on Ergodic Secrecy Rate
To gain more insight, we employ again the upper bound on the ergodic capacity of the eavesdropper
provided in Theorem 2. Combining (6), (15), (42), and (43), we obtain simple lower bounds for the ergodic
secrecy rate for the N and R methods as Rsec,Nnk =[
log2
(
(b+ 1− λ)βζ + [(β + c)λ− (b+ 1− λ)β]ζφ− ζ(β + c)λφ2
(b+ 1− λ)βζ + [(β + c− 1)λζ + (b+ 1− λ)(1− ζ)]φ+ (1− ζ)(β + c− 1)λφ2
)]+
, (44)
and
Rsec,Rnk =
[
log2
(
(b+ 1)βζ + [cλ− (b+ 1)β]ζφ− ζcλφ2
(b+ 1)βζ + [(c− 1)λζ + (b+ 1)(1− ζ)]φ+ (1− ζ)(c− 1)λφ2
)]+
, (45)
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respectively.
In the following, we investigate the impact of the system parameters on the ergodic secrecy rate in detail.
Impact of α: Similar to the perfect training case we investigate in the following the upper limit for α such
that a positive secrecy rate can be achieved. We observe from (44) and (45) that a non-zero secrecy rate can
be achieved as long as α < αΨsec holds where
αNsec =
a2(1− β)λ
a(1− β)(1 + b− λ) + cλ
β→0
=
a2λ
a(1 + b− λ) + cλ, (46)
αRsec =
a2(1− β)λ
a(1− β)(1 + b) + cλ
β→0
=
a2λ
a(1 + b) + cλ
. (47)
Eqs. (46) and (47) reveal that the robustness of the considered multi-cell MIMO system to eavesdropping is
monotonically decreasing with increasing number of MTs in the system. On the other hand, allocating more
resources to training, i.e., increasing λ by increasing the pilot power, pτ , or the pilot sequence duration, τ , leads
to a higher robustness against eavesdropping, i.e., a larger number of eavesdropper antennas can be tolerated.
Furthermore, as expected, αNsec > αRsec, i.e., the more complex N -method is more robust to eavesdropping
than the simple R method. However, αRsec approaches αNsec if λ is small, i.e., both methods have a similar
robustness to eavesdropping in case of strong pilot contamination since, in this case, the N -method can no
longer avoid AN leakage within the local cell. We also note that, as expected, since λ ≤ 1/b ≤ 1 always
holds, for a given AN shaping matrix design, the maximum tolerable number of eavesdropper antennas in
case of pilot contamination is always smaller than that in case of perfect training, cf. (29), (28), and (46),
(47).
Impact of φ: Similar to the case of perfect training, the ergodic secrecy rate for both AN shaping matrix
designs becomes zero for φ = φ0 = 0 also for the case of pilot contamination, cf. (44) and (45), since zero
power is allocated to information transmission in this case. A second zero of the ergodic secrecy rate occurs
for φ = φΨ1 , 0 < φΨ1 < 1, where Ψ ∈ {N ,R}. φΨ1 is obtained from (44) and (45) as
φN1 = 1−
αa(β − 1)((b+ 1)β + λ(c− 1))
λ(a(a+ α)β2 + (−a2 + α(c− 2)a+ cα)β − aα(c− 1)) (48)
φR1 = 1−
αa(β − 1)((b+ 1)β + λ(c− 1))
λ(a2β2 + (−a2 + aα(c− 1) + cα)β − aα(c− 1)) . (49)
Furthermore, assuming α < αΨsec and taking the derivatives of (44) and (45) with respect to φ and setting
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them to zero, we obtain the optimal power allocation factors for the N and R methods as
φ∗N =
−√(b+ 1− λ)((−1 + c)λ+ (b+ 1)β)β((β + cζ)λ+ (−1 + ζ)β(b+ 1))λ
(−λβ2 + ((2− 2c− ζ)λ+ (−1 + ζ)(b+ 1))β − cλ(−1 + c))λ
+
(−λ2 + (b+ 1)λ)β2 + ((−c− ζ + 1)λ2 + ((ζ − 1 + c)b+ ζ − 1 + c)λ)β
(−λβ2 + ((2− 2c− ζ)λ+ (−1 + ζ)(b+ 1))β − cλ(−1 + c))λ (50)
and
φ∗R =
−√λ((−1 + c)λ+ (b+ 1)β)(b+ 1)(cζλ+ (−1 + ζ)β(b+ 1))β + ((ζ − 1 + c)b+ ζ − 1 + c)λβ
λ((−1 + ζ)β(b+ 1)− cλ(−1 + c)) .
(51)
Impact of β: Based on (50) and (51) it can be shown that, similar to the case for perfect training, for
pilot contamination, the optimal φ∗N and φ∗R are monotonically increasing in β. Furthermore, in Section IV,
we found that, for perfect training, the ergodic secrecy rate is monotonically increasing for decreasing β.
However, for a given φ, it can be shown based on (44) and (45) that this is no longer true in case of pilot
contamination. In other words, if φ and the number of users K are fixed, in case of pilot contamination, the
ergodic secrecy rate is not maximized by making the number of BS antennas, Nt, exceedingly large (i.e.,
Nt ≫ K such that β → 0). Instead, there is an optimal finite number of BS antennas. We will investigate
this issue numerically in Section VI.
Impact of λ: Pilot contamination impacts the ergodic secrecy rate via λ, where smaller values of λ imply
that the MTs expend less resources for uplink training (i.e., they employ a smaller pilot power pτ and/or
a shorter pilot sequence length, τ ). First, we observe from (44) and (45) that both Rsec,Nnk and Rsec,Rnk are
increasing functions of λ, i.e., as expected, if the MTs employ a higher pilot power and/or a longer pilot
sequence for channel estimation, the ergodic secrecy rate improves. Furthermore, αsec is an increasing function
of λ, i.e., a higher uplink training power and/or longer pilot sequence lengths increase the operating region
of the system where a non-zero secrecy rate can be achieved.
On the other hand, for a given coherence interval T , fixed transmit power P , and fixed pilot power pτ , the
fraction of time allocated for training τ/T (and as a consequence λ) can be optimized for maximization of
the net ergodic secrecy rate given by (1−τ/T )Rsec,Ψnk , Ψ ∈ {N ,R}. We assume that the channels are constant
within one coherence interval but change from one coherence interval to the next. We also emphasize that
by using the (net) ergodic secrecy rate as a performance measure, we implicitly assume coding over many
coherence intervals. For small τ , the factor (1 − τ/T ) is large but the ergodic secrecy rate, Rsec,Ψnk , is small
because of the unreliable channel estimation. On the other hand, for large τ , the factor (1 − τ/T ) is small
but the ergodic secrecy rate, Rsec,Ψnk , is large because of the more accurate channel estimation. Hence, τ can
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be optimized for optimal performance [21]. The optimization of τ will be studied numerically in Fig. 9 in
Section VI.
C. Secrecy Outage Probability Analysis
Plugging (42) and (43) into the secrecy outage probability expression derived in (34), we obtain an upper
bound for the secrecy outage probability for the case of pilot contamination as
εΨout = 1− Fγeve(2R
Ψ
nk−R0 − 1), (52)
where Ψ ∈ {N ,R}.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we evaluate the secrecy performance of the considered multi-cell massive MIMO systems
based on the analytical expressions derived in Sections III-V and via Monte-Carlo simulation. We consider
a system with M = 7 hexagonal cells and adopt the simplified path-loss model, i.e., the severeness of the
inter-cell interference is characterized by parameter ρ only. The Monte-Carlo simulation results for the ergodic
secrecy rate of the kth MT in the local cell are based on (6) where the achievable ergodic rate Rnk is obtained
from (8) and the ergodic secrecy capacity of the eavesdropper is obtained from (7). Thereby, the expected
values in (8) and (7) were evaluated by averaging over 3000 random channel realizations. The Monte-Carlo
simulation results for the outage probability are obtained from εout = Pr{Rnk − log2(1 + γeve) ≤ R0}, which
was evaluated again based on 3000 random channel realizations. The values of all relevant system parameters
are provided in the captions of the figures.
A. Ergodic Secrecy Rate and Secrecy Outage Probability
For the results shown in this section, we adopt a fixed power allocation factor of φ = 0.75. The optimization
of φ will be addressed in the next subsection.
In Fig. 2, we verify the derived analytical expressions for the ergodic capacity of the eavesdropper which
seeks to decode the information intended for the kth MT in the local cell. The analytical results were generated
with (12) while the upper bound results were computed with (15). The vertical dashed lines denote β =
1−cα/a2. Fig. 2 reveals that for β < 1−cα/a2, the upper bound is very tight. For 1−cα/a2 < β < 1−α/M ,
the upper bound is not applicable, although the ergodic capacity of the eavesdropper is still finite, cf. Theorem 2
and Remark 1. For β → 1−α/M , the ergodic capacity of the eavesdropper tends to infinity since X becomes
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Fig. 2. Ergodic capacity of the eavesdropper seeking to decode the information intended for the kth MT in the local cell vs. the normalized
number of MTs in the cell, β, for a system with total transmit power P = 10 dB, M = 7, φ = 0.75, and Nt = 100.
singular. Furthermore, we observe from Fig. 2 that increasing inter-cell interference (i.e., larger inter-cell
interference factors, ρ) has a negative effect on the ergodic capacity of the eavesdropper, whereas as expected,
the eavesdropper can improve his performance by adding more antennas, Ne (i.e., by increasing α). Moreover,
Fig. 2 confirms that the ergodic capacity of the eavesdropper is monotonically decreasing in β in the interval
(0, 1 − √cα/a) and monotonically increasing in β in the interval (1 − √cα/a, 1 − cα/a2). The resulting
minimum of the ergodic capacity of the eavesdropper at β = 1 − √cα/a is denoted by a black circle in
Fig. 2.
In Fig. 3, for the case of perfect training, we show the ergodic secrecy rate vs. the number of BS antennas
(subfigure (a)) and the secrecy outage probability vs. the target secrecy rate R0 (subfigure (b)) for the kth
MT in the local cell. Results for both considered AN shaping matrix designs are shown. In subfigure (a),
lower bound I was obtained based on (6), (12), (23), and (24) and lower bound II was obtained with (26) and
(27). In subfigure (b), the upper bound was obtained with (34). Fig. 3 reveals that the derived bounds for the
ergodic secrecy rate and the secrecy outage probability are accurate. As expected, for the ergodic secrecy rate,
lower bound I is somewhat tighter than lower bound II. Furthermore, increasing the number of BS antennas
Nt improves both the ergodic secrecy rate as well as the secrecy outage probability. Moreover, as expected,
the N -method for generation of the AN shaping matrix always outperforms the R-method as the N -method
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Fig. 3. Ergodic secrecy rate and outage probability for perfect training, M = 7, P = 10 dB, K = 10, ρ = 0.3, α = 0.1, and φ = 0.75.
avoids intra-cell AN leakage.
In Fig. 4, we show the same performance metrics as in Fig. 3, however, now for the case of pilot
contamination. In subfigure (a), lower bound I was obtained based on (6), (12), (42), and (43), whereas
lower bound II was obtained with (44) and (45). In subfigure (b), the upper bound was obtained with (52).
Similar to the case of perfect training, the derived bounds on the ergodic secrecy rate and the secrecy outage
probability are very tight. A comparison of Figs. 3 and 4 reveals that pilot contamination causes a significant
performance degradation in terms of both ergodic secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability. Furthermore,
unlike for the case of perfect training, for pilot contamination, the ergodic secrecy rate is not monotonically
increasing in Nt but has a unique maximum for both AN shaping matrix designs.
B. Optimal Power Allocation
In this subsection, we investigate the optimization of power allocation factor φ and illustrate its impact on
the ergodic secrecy rate.
Figs. 5 and 6 show the ergodic secrecy rates of the kth MT in the local cell as functions of φ for the cases
of perfect training and pilot contamination, respectively. The ergodic secrecy rate curves were obtained via
Monte Carlo simulation and various values of α and β are considered. The optimal values for φ obtained
with (32)/(33) (for perfect training) and (50)/(51) (for pilot contamination) are denoted by black circles. As
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Fig. 4. Ergodic secrecy rate and outage probability for pilot contamination, M = 7, P = 10 dB, K = 10 MTs, ρ = 0.1, α = 0.1, φ = 0.75,
τ = K, and pτ = P/K.
expected from our discussions in Sections IV and V, Figs. 5 and 6 show that, for both the N and the R AN
shaping matrix desigs, the optimal φ∗ is decreasing in α, i.e., the system should allocate more power to AN
if the eavesdropper is becoming stronger, and increasing in β, i.e., less power should be allocated to AN if
the number of users increases. For α = 0.4, no results are shown for the case of pilot contamination in Fig. 6
since the corresponding ergodic secrecy rates are zero for all choices of φ, i.e., α > αsec holds in this case.
In Fig. 7, we depict the ergodic secrecy rate and the optimal power allocation factor, φ∗, as functions of the
normalized number of MTs in each cell, β. Thereby, the ergodic secrecy rate is calculated using the optimal
φ∗, which was obtained based on the analytical results in Sections IV and V for the case of perfect training
and pilot contamination, respectively. We observe that, unlike the case when φ is fixed, if φ is optimized,
the ergodic secrecy rate is a non-increasing function of β also in case of pilot contamination, i.e., for a
given number of users, increasing the number of BS antennas is always beneficial. On the other hand, for all
considered cases, the optimal value of φ is a monotonically increasing function of β, i.e., as the number of
users in the system increases relative to the number of BS antennas, less power is allocated to AN. Also, the
performance gap between both AN shaping matrix design methods decreases with increasing β.
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C. Conditions for Non-zero Ergodic Secrecy Rate
In Fig. 8, we illustrate for both AN shaping matrix designs under what conditions a non-zero ergodic
secrecy rate is possible. To this end, we plot αsec as defined in (28), (29), (46), and (47) as functions of β
for pτ = P/K (subfigure on left hand side) and the amount of power, pτ , spent by the MTs for training for
β = 0.05, 0.5 (subfigure on right hand side). For α ≥ αsec, the ergodic secrecy rate is zero regardless of the
amount of power allocated to AN. On the other hand, for α < αsec, a positive ergodic secrecy rate can be
achieved. We observe from Fig. 8 that for both AN shaping matrix designs αsec is a decreasing function of β,
whereas it is an increasing function of pτ , i.e., the more reliable the channel estimates, the more eavesdropper
antennas can be tolerated before the ergodic secrecy rate drops to zero. However, αsec saturates for large
values of pτ . We note that the values of αsec are smaller for the R-method than for the N -method because
of the larger intra-cell AN leakage caused by the R-method.
D. Optimization of the Net Ergodic Secrecy Rate
Fig. 9 depicts the net ergodic secrecy rate, (1 − τ/T )Rsecnk , as a function of λ, where the lower bounds in
(44) and (45) were used to approximate Rsecnk . The cases of T = 100 and T = 500 are considered for K = 5
May 29, 2014 DRAFT
28
0 0.5 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
β
α
se
c
 
 
N -method
R-method
0 10 20 30
0.26
0.28
0.3
0.32
0.34
0.36
0.38
pτ in dB
α
se
c
 
 
β = 0.05
β = 0.5
Perfect training
Pilot contamination
R-method
N -method
Fig. 8. αsec vs. β and pτ for pilot contamination, total transmit power P = 20 dB, M = 7, Nt = 100, ρ = 0.1, and τ = K.
and K = 20 MTs. We assume that pτ = 0 dB and λ is varied by changing τ and the optimal power allocation
factor φ∗ is employed. Thereby, the range of possible τ is [K, T ), which directly translates into the range of
possible λ as λ = pττ
1+pττa
. Fig. 9 reveals that the optimal λ is (slightly) increasing in T since for larger values
of T , more time for allocation to uplink training is available, i.e., τ can be increased resulting in a larger
value for the optimal λ. For K = 20, the lower limit of the permissible interval for τ given by τ = K yields
the maximum net secrecy rate. In this case, increasing τ beyond τ = K does not improve Rsecnk sufficiently
to compensate for the decrease of the term 1− τ/T .
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered a multi-cell massive MIMO system with matched-filter precoding and AN
generation at the BS for secure downlink transmission in the presence of a multi-antenna passive eavesdropper.
For AN generation, we considered both the conventional null space based AN shaping matrix design and a
novel random AN shaping matrix design. For both perfect training and pilot contamination, we derived two
tight lower bounds on the ergodic secrecy rate and a tight upper bound on the secrecy outage probability. The
analytical expressions allowed us to optimize the amount of power allocated to AN generation and to gain
significant insight into the impact of the system parameters on performance. In particular, our results reveal
that for the considered multi-cell massive MIMO system with matched-filter precoding (1) AN generation is
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Fig. 9. Net ergodic secrecy rate vs. λ for a system with optimal φ∗, Nt = 100, M = 7, α = 0.1, P = 10 dB, pτ = 0 dB, and ρ = 0.1. Black
circles denote the maximum net ergodic secrecy rate.
necessary to achieve a non-zero ergodic secrecy rate if the user and the eavesdropper experience the same
path-loss, (2) secrecy cannot be guaranteed if the eavesdropper has too many antennas, (3) for the case of
pilot contamination, the ergodic secrecy rate is only an increasing function of the number of BS antennas
if the amount of power allocated to AN generation is optimized, and (4) the proposed random AN shaping
matrix design is a promising low-complexity alternative to the conventional null space based AN shaping
matrix design.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
The proof closely follows [7]. We first derive an expression for the secrecy rate for given realizations of
hmk and Hevem , k = 1, . . . , K, m = 1, . . . ,M . Since the MISOME channel in (4) and (5) is a non-degraded
broadcast channel [3], the secrecy capacity is given by [7], [22]
Csecnk (h) = max
snk→wnksnk→ynk,yeve
I (snk; ynk|h)− I (snk;yeve|h) , (53)
where vector h contains the CSI of all user and eavesdropper channels and I(x; y|h) is the mutual information
between two r.v.s x and y conditioned on the CSI vector. Csecnk (h) is achieved by maximizing over all joint
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distributions such that a Markov chain snk → wnksnk → ynk,yeve results, where snk is an arbitrary input
variable [7]. Specifically, for snk ∼ CN(0, 1) an achievable secrecy rate for the kth MT in the local cell,
Rsecnk (h), is given by
Rsecnk (h) =
[
I (snk; ynk|h)− I (snk;yeve|h)
]+
(a)
=
[
I (wnksnk; ynk|h)− I (wnksnk;yeve|h)
]+
(b)
≥
[
Rnk (h)− Cevenk (h)
]+
(54)
where (a) follows sincewnksnk is a deterministic function of snk. Furthermore, Rnk(h) ≤ max I (wnksnk; ynk|h)
is an achievable rate of the kth MT in the local cell and Cevenk (h) = log2
(
1 + pwHnkH
eveH
n X
−1Heven wnk
) ≥
I (wnksnk;yeve|h) is an upper bound on the mutual information I (wnksnk;yeve|h). Thus, follows (b). We
note that for computation of Cevenk (h) we made the worst-case assumption that the eavesdropper can decode
and cancel the signals of all MTs except the signal intended for the MT of interest [23, Chapter 10.2].
Finally, to arrive at the ergodic secrecy rate, we average Rsecnk (h) over all channel realizations, which results
in [10]
E
[
Rsecnk (h)
]
= E
[[
Rnk (h)− Cevenk (h)
]+]
≥
[
E [Rnk (h)]− E [Cevenk (h)]
]+
= Rsecnk . (55)
Introducing the definitions of the achievable ergodic secrecy rate, Rnk = E [Rnk (h)], and the ergodic
eavesdropper capacity, Cevenk = E [Cevenk (h)], completes the proof.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
We first recall that the entries of Hevem , m = 1, . . . ,M , are mutually independent complex Gaussian r.v.s. On
the other hand, for Nt →∞ and both AN shaping matrix designs, the vectors vml, l = 1, . . . , Nt−K, form an
orthonormal basis. Hence, Hevem Vm, m = 1, . . . ,M , also has independent complex Gaussian entries, which are
independent from the complex Gaussian entries of Heven wnk. Thus, the term γeve = pwHnkHeveHn X−1Heven wnk
in (7) is equivalent to the SINR of an Ne-branch MMSE diversity combiner with M(Nt−K) interferers [10],
[24]. As a result, for the considered simplified path-loss model, the cumulative density function (CDF) of the
received SINR, γeve, at the eavesdropper is given by [24]
Fγeve(x) =
∑Ne−1
i=0 λix
i∏2
j=1(1 + µjx)
bj
, (56)
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where λi, µj , and bj are defined in Theorem 1. Exploiting (56), we can rewrite (7) as
Ceve
(a)
=
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
(1 + x)−1Fγeve(x)dx
=
1
ln 2
Ne−1∑
i=0
λi ×
∫ ∞
0
xi
(1 + x)
∏2
j=1(1 + µjx)
bj
dx
(b)
=
1
ln 2
Ne−1∑
i=0
λi × 1
µ0
2∑
j=1
bj∑
l=1
∫ ∞
0
ωjl
(x+ 1)(x+ 1
µj
)l
dx
(c)
=
1
ln 2
Ne−1∑
i=0
λi × 1
µ0
2∑
j=1
bj∑
l=2
ωjlI(1/µj, l), (57)
where µ0, ωjl, and I(·, ·) are defined in Theorem 1. Here, (a) is obtained using integration by parts, (b) holds
if the order of x in the denominator of (56) is not smaller than that in the numerator, i.e., Nt−K ≥ Ne/M or
equivalently 1− β ≥ α/M , which is also the condition to ensure invertibility of X in (7), and (c) is obtained
using the definition of I(·, ·) given in Theorem 1. This completes the proof.
C. Proof of Theorem 2
Using Jensen’s inequality and the mutual independence of w˜nk = Heven wnk and Hevem Vm, m = 1, . . . ,M
(cf. Appendix B), Cevenk in (7) is upper bounded by
Cevenk ≤ log2
(
1 + Ew˜nk
[
pw˜HnkE
[
X−1
]
w˜nk
])
. (58)
Let us first focus on the term E [X−1] in (58) and note that X is statistically equivalent to a weighted sum
of two scaled Wishart matrices [25]. Specifically, we have X = qX1 + ρqX2 with X1 ∼ WNe(Nt −K, INe)
and X2 ∼ WNe((M − 1)(Nt−K), INe), where WA(B, IA) denotes an A×A Wishart matrix with B degrees
of freedom. Strictly speaking, X is not a Wishart matrix, and the exact distribution of X seems intractable.
However, X may be accurately approximated as a single scaled Wishart matrix, X ∼ WNe(ϕ, ξINe), where
parameters ξ and ϕ are chosen such that the first two moments of X and qX1+ρqX2 are identical [26], [27].
Equating the first two moments of the traces of these matrices yields [27]
ξϕ = q(Nt −K) + ρq(M − 1)(Nt −K), (59)
and
ξ2ϕ = q2(Nt −K) + ρ2q2(M − 1)(Nt −K). (60)
May 29, 2014 DRAFT
32
By exploiting the expectation of an inverse Wishart matrix given in [27, Eq. (12)], we obtain E[X−1] =
1
ξ(ϕ−Ne−1)INe with ξ = cq/a if ϕ−Ne > 1 or equivalently if β < 1− cα/a2 for Nt →∞. Plugging this result
and E[w˜Hnkw˜nk] = Ne into (58), we finally obtain the result in (15). This completes the proof.
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